HOW THE BRITISH HARMED THE WEST TO HELP THE NORTH

 ROB PETER TO PAY PAUL:

HOW THE BRITISH HARMED THE WEST TO HELP THE NORTH

By Ajiroba Yemi Kotun 

LONG POST ALERT!

"A government that robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of Paul.” – George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950)

PEOPLE generally become affected when they are not secure. They get unhinged and unsettled. As such, the Northerners were unhinged and unsettled by the liaison between Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904-1996) and Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1909-1987). They quickly derided their hookup as an “unholy alliance” and pooh-poohed it as "sweetness and light" [Continued from “When Greeks Join'd Greeks: Why Northerners Planted their Feet in their Region”]. That’s how the truncated House of Representatives stayed the course and proceeded with unanimity to pass the motion for adjournment. Home is where the heart is; there is no place like home. Soon after, the remaining members, having successively put a poke in the self-government wheel, called it a day and organized for their journey back to the North. The hare always returns to her form.

Necessarily, the Action Group, as a result, looked to its four Federal Ministers for a unifying lead based on earlier party decision reached for them to resign their Council portfolios in such circumstances and assume their seats as common members of the House of Representatives. That same morning of Tuesday, March 31, 1953, therefore, witnessed the tendering of the resignation of Oba Adesoji Aderemi (1889-1980), the Ọọ̀ni of Ifẹ̀, as Minister without Portfolio in the federal cabinet. He led in that direction while the other three AG ministers, Bode Thomas (1918-1953), Ladoke Akintola (1910-1966), and Arthur Edward Prest (1906-1976), an Itsekiri politician, promptly followed with theirs. The spate of resignations thus touched off the constitutional crisis, which Sir John Macpherson (1898-1971), who said the brazen-faced behavior of Bode Thomas will not be tolerated, had worked tirelessly to prevent. He had tried without success to replace the four ministers, who resigned, with such A.G. men as the "exceedingly competent" and "scholarly" Steven Oluwole Awokoya (1913-1985), Awolowo's dynamic Minister of Education who "is credited for the creation of the universal primary education in Western Nigeria" (see Milton Krieger, "Education and Development in Western Nigeria: The Legacy of S. O. Awokoya, 1952-1955", The International Journal of African Historical Studies > Vol. 20, No. 4 (1987); Samuel Osarogie Ighodaro (1911- ), Action Group Treasurer (1950-1962) and Minister of Health, Western Region (1952-1956); and Anthony Enahoro (1923-2010), a newspaper editor and parliamentarian. Chief Awolowo, never one to desert his men in battle, informed an anxious Western House of Assembly, even as he tried to handle a difficult situation with perfect self-possession, saying:

“Ever since the Governor-General, Sir John Macherson, started his whispering campaign of rudeness against Bode Thomas and others, I have taken steps to find out the facts. It is clear that Sir John is a die-hard imperialist of the deepest dye. Now, because Chief Bode Thomas and Mr. Akintola have been the chief spokesmen of the West, the governor and his northern and eastern allies have marked down the heroes of our freedom struggles for utter destruction. To achieve this, they have invented the story of rudeness to the governor. But the more the governor and his allies hate these stalwarts of ours, the more our affection for them grow.”

In the Western Region as in other places in the South, democratic practices were unheard of outside Lagos. Many Obas and Chiefs at the local government level ruled with unlimited authority, even enjoying legislative support. Justice that was expected to be served the people by the so-called Native Courts, in accordance with customary applications, had long taken flight - with the backwash that the courts cheerfully became lodges and houses of utter depravity and corruption, and tools of cruelty, unfair treatment, and oppressive power exerted by the Native Authority <Refers to Amos 5:14>. It was easy to see that in most places in the Western Region, people were already becoming rebellious  and threatening to revolt.   

As a result, the Action Group tried to get around violence or shun any action that might necessarily cause outrage or discordance. Instead, it put to good use the party machinery and propaganda at its disposal to marshal enough public opinion and support. On this, the AG and the NCNC were united, not minding the brickbats they resorted to hurling at one another occasionally, as each feared being outclassed by the other in the struggle to win Nigeria her self-determination. But then, the Action Group's unbroken, constructive party-spawned constitutional crisis was portending to produce an alluvion of political proportions, which undoubtedly not only placed Sir John's job in the greatest jeopardy, but also necessitated Britain to later obligate the Regions to become self-governing and exercise more independence. 

Of course, this AG's go-getting ambitiousness and the following political tensions in the North became the crucial climacteric or watershed in the struggle to free Nigeria from its colonial status. Relating to 'the sixty four thousand dollar' motion by Enahoro, Awolowo later noted in his autobiography, pg. 240:

"This motion constitutes the most prominent landmark in Nigeria's struggles for freedom. It marked the unmistakable beginning of the end of British rule in Nigeria. It also turned out to be the most controversial, the most intriguing and the most explosive motion ever tabled in the annals of Nigeria's parliament."

Unbeknownst to many at the time, Chief Enahoro had taken the bit between his teeth when he moved the 1953 self-government motion, which unleashed a hurricane on the floor of the House. He refused to hold any consultations with his fellow members in the Action Group, perhaps, fearing he would be discouraged. It was an idea that had been kicking around for about a year, but he knew, though, that he could not begin to so move a motion of such proportion without Chief Awolowo's blessing, which he obtained from him and him alone. 

The best wine, they say, comes out of an old bottle, but youth and age hardly ever agree, too. While the elderly opponents of the motion in the party exhorted that the NPC's support over the vexing issue of a target date was very crucial and should have been sought earlier, the young supporters of the motion spoke in favor of Nigeria's speedy political progress that can only be attained through goading the Northern leaders, who they accused of obstructionism, to quit their hardline rabid-conservatism. The latter position seemed compatible with the idea of Alfred Edward (1859-1936), better known as A.E. Houseman, an English classical scholar and poet, who espoused that "Liberty consists in the absence of obstructions."

If Enahoro believed that Awolowo was unassailable or untouchable, he was proved wrong. Other leading members of the AG read about the motion in the newspapers like everyone else, and went bananas, understandably. Like the Northerners, they reasoned that the motion was fraught with danger and described it as a tinderbox, a flash point, or even a powder keg for everyone on both sides of the aisle. It was no wonder then that the ensued discussion, on whether to retain or give up the Enahoro motion on self-government, aroused much controversy within and outside the party. Enahoro and Awolowo were upbraided by their colleagues in the AG for their daredevil stunts which some of them were sure to end in disaster someday. 

Though frustrating, the intemperate tongue-lashing, to which both men were subjected, failed to dissuade them from forging ahead in marketing their 'product'. What's done cannot be undone no matter the abuse. You can't put back the clock either. The motion's two most exposed proponents might as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb, they thought. And since an oak is not felled at one stroke, they hoped to have more than one bite at the cherry. Without much mental comments, the two men [Awolowo and Enahoro] hearkened to the words of Albert Einstein (1879-1955), a German-born theoretical physicist who developed the theory of relativity and picked up the 1921 Nobel Prize in Physics, that "Freedom, in any case, is only possible by constantly struggling for it." They, therefore, continued to put their back into the cherry of self-government. They bent over backwards to the last possible minute and refused to accept that a miss was as good as a mile. Although their critics' point was well-taken, the duo considered it a storm in a tea cup, insisting that you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs and that there was really nothing to get all hot and bothered about. Although the self-government motion by Anthony Enahoro had been defeated, its knife had already sunk deeply into the wood of independence and could not be moved henceforth. 

It is an understatement to say that the Northerners were terribly troubled by their Southern colleagues, principally - the Action Groupers. The acrimonious rift in the lute <Refers to a quotation from "Idylls of the King" by Alfred Lord Tennyson (1809-1892)>, so provoked, was to carry on sickeningly in dogging every political move between the Action Group and its Yoruba electorate and the NPC and its Hausa-Fulani voting public ad nauseam. Those who share the points raised by the Sardauna agree that even if the British were to allow independence in 1956 (just what the Action Group ‘doctors’ had ordered), the bliss or joy of such independence would have been short-lived. This will be so because it was feared that horrible blemishes, such as anarchy and disunity, would combine to stain the new garment of an independent Nigeria after a short while, given the disadvantaged state of the North which, even so, was demographically more imposing than the remaining two Regions [East and West] put together, no thanks to the British (See "Deceit in God's Face" of 19/12/2020 by this writer). 

Others maintain that even if the North had agreed, to what was generally feared would be a clearly imbalanced relationship, the NCNC and the Action Group would have been contending one another in ‘battle’ almost immediately. Perhaps, Enahoro's motion was a shot across the bows. However, it was widely held that his motion was significant as well as crucial because it awakened the North from its lethargy and spurred it to act. Certainly, this would not have been brought about if the North had been left to carry on thinking there was a suitable moment to demand or prepare for independence, thus hindering the headstrong South needlessly. Trust the Lagosians. Their reaction and that of the Southern press was typically firm. The antics of the Action Group always made good fodder for the vibrant Lagos media which branded the Northerners as "feudalists" and "imperialist stooges." On their way back to the North, the Lagos crowd, which was eager for the fray, trailed the Northern representatives to the Iddo railway station, hissing and mocking them openly, thereby adding fuel to the fire. 

Upon reaching the North, it appeared more of a propensity that was other than rational when the bright-eyed and bushy-tailed Ahmadu Bello and other Northern leaders decided to energize the matter by threatening to pull out of Nigeria if the South continued to humiliate the North as an Aunt Sally, a fifth wheel or just put it down as a pariah in the country. At this point, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe threw his hat in the ring. The NCNC leader, did not delay to warn the Northern leaders who contemplated breaking away from Nigeria. Convinced that they were putting their foot in their mouth, Zik advised the Northerners not to reject his wise counsel. He spewed forth in his 1953 speech on secession (See Nnamdi Azikiwe’s "Speech On Secession"):

"I have invited you to attend this caucus because I would like you to make clear our stand on the issue of secession. As a party, we would have preferred Nigeria to remain intact, but lest there be doubt as to our willingness to concede to any shade of political opinion the right to determine its policy, I am obliged to issue a solemn warning to those who are goading the North towards secession. If you agree with my views, then I hope that in course of our deliberations tonight, you will endorse them, to enable me to publicize them in the Press.

"In my opinion, the Northerners are perfectly entitled to consider whether or not they should secede from the indissoluble union which nature has formed between it and the South, but it would be calamitous to the corporate existence of the North should the clamor for secession prevail. I, therefore, counsel Northern leaders to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of secession before embarking upon this dangerous course.

"As one who was born in the North, I have a deep spiritual attachment to that part of the country, but it would be a capital political blunder if the North should break away from the South. The latter is in a better position to make rapid constitutional advance, so that if the North should become truncated from the South, it would benefit both Southerners and Northerners who are domiciled in the South more than their kith and kin who are domiciled in the North.

"There are seven reasons for my holding to this view. Secession by the North may lead to internal political convulsion there when it is realized that militant nationalists and their organizations, like the NLPU, the Askianist Movement, and the Middle Zone League, have aspirations for self-government in 1956 identical with those of their Southern compatriots. It may lead to justifiable demands for the right of self-determination by non-Muslims, who form the majority of the population in the so-called ‘Pagan’ provinces, like Benue, Ilorin, Kabba, Niger and Plateau, not to mention the claims of non-Muslims who are domiciled in Adamawa and Bauchi Provinces."

Azikiwe further warned that secession by the North just might develop into "economic nationalism in the Eastern Region", which may choose to "pursue a policy of blockade of the North, by refusing it access to the sea, over and under the River Niger,...": 

"It may lead to economic nationalism in the Eastern Region, which can pursue a policy of blockade of the North, by refusing it access to the sea, over and under the River Niger, except upon payment of tolls. It may lead to economic warfare between the North on the one hand, and the Eastern or Western regions on the other, should they decide to fix protective tariffs which will make the use of the ports of the East and West uneconomic for the North.

"The North may be rich in mineral resources and certain cash crops, but that is no guarantee that it would be capable of growing sufficient food crops to enable it to feed its teeming millions, unlike the East and the West. Secession may create hardship for Easterners and Westerners who are domiciled in the North, since the price of food crops to be imported into the North from the South is bound to be very high and to cause an increase in the cost of living. Lastly, it will endanger the relations with their neighbors of millions of Northerners who are domiciled in the East and West and Easterners and Westerners who reside in the North.

"You may ask me whether there would be a prospect of civil war, if the North decided to secede? My answer would be that it is a hypothetical question which only time can answer. In any case, the plausible cause of a civil war might be a dispute as to the rite of passage on the River Niger, or the right of flight over the territory of the Eastern or Western Region; but such disputes can be settled diplomatically, instead of by force.

"Nevertheless, if civil war should become inevitable at this stage of our progress as a nation, then security considerations must be borne in mind by those who are charged with the responsibility of government of the North and the South. Military forces and installations are fairly distributed in all the three regions; if that is not the case, any of the regions can obtain military aid from certain interested Powers. It means that we cannot preclude the possibility of alliance with certain countries.”

To the threat that the Northerners would keep up their nonstop advance to the Atlantic Ocean to deepen the Holy Koran if the British left Nigeria in the lurch, as was prophesied in 1947, Zik replied in this way: 

"You may ask me to agree that if the British left Nigeria to its fate, the Northerners would continue their uninterrupted march to the sea, as was prophesied six years ago? My reply is that such an empty threat is devoid of historical substance and that so far as I know, the Eastern Region has never been subjugated by any indigenous African invader. At the price of being accused of overconfidence, I will risk a prophecy and say that, other things being equal, the Easterners will defend themselves gallantly, if and when they are invaded.

"Let me take this opportunity to warn those who are making a mountain out of the molehill of the constitutional crisis to be more restrained and constructive. The dissemination of lies abroad; the publishing of flamboyant headlines about secessionist plans, and the goading of empty-headed careerists with gaseous ideas about their own importance in tile scheme of things in the North, is being overdone in certain quarters. I feel that these quarters must be held responsible for any breach between the North and South, which nature had indissolubly united in a political, social and economic marriage of convenience. In my personal opinion, there is no sense in the North breaking away or the East or the West breaking away; it would be better if all the regions would address themselves to the task of crystallizing common nationality, irrespective of the extraneous influences at work. What history has joined together let no man put asunder. But history is a strange mistress which can cause strange things to happen!"

Ironically in a far worse but under similar situation in 1967, Azikiwe, the most prominent politician to escape liquidation in the January 15, 1966 coup, became Biafra's mouthpiece and adviser to the secessionist, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (1933-2011), during the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967-1970). But, not for long as the usually wise, skilled, and respected Zik afterwards changed positions on key issues and swapped his precarious Biafran commitment for stable Nigerian devotedness while the war yet raged. To Ojukwu's consternation, Azikiwe made an earnest plea for the de-escalation of hostilities using flyers and interviews, and getting a big boot out of it. 

Clearly, the Southern leaders, who had tritely upheld that the Northern leaders never represented their people but themselves, would hear nothing of secession of any Region from Nigeria. They, therefore, organized to take the plunge and move the fight to them in the North, presumably to explain to the Northern talakawa, who were commonly down in the dumps like their counterparts in the South, exactly why they needed to disown their leaders and demand independence in 1956. By doing this, the Southern leaders only succeeded in stirring up a hornet’s nest because the Northern leaders saw them as flogging a dead horse and refused to take their planned political campaigning in the North on the chin. 

Accordingly, they vowed to make such a dirty tricks campaign in their Region very difficult and painful for any Southern politician or leader who so wished to venture into the lion’s den. It was a definite case of “the not in my back yard” syndrome. Thenceforth, the Northerners kept their fingers on the pulse generally <Refers to a doctor checking the rate of someone's pulse for health reasons>, and the Sardauna stuck out like a sore thumb particularly. The Southern politicians also battened down the hatches. This was the state of affairs that the Deputy Leader of the Action Group, Chief S.L. Akintola, a brilliant and spirited campaigner, who not only spoke Yoruba and English fluently, but also Hausa and Nupe effortlessly, and whose party had sent to the North since Sunday, May 10, 1953, met on the ground upon arriving Kano on Saturday, May 16. Akintola and his party just won't let sleeping dogs lie.

The District Officer, Douglas Potts, didn’t seem to have acted swiftly enough in cancelling Chief Akintola’s planned campaign meeting because, by the time he did, the fat was already in the fire and a violent public disorder in full swing. The fact that the violent attack, by the Hausa in Kano, seemed to have been predominantly concentrated on the Igbo traders and shopkeepers instead of the Yoruba supporters of Chief Akintola’s Action Group, made it extremely confusing or difficult to understand. It also up-stretched the argument that rather than being perceived as political, the wrath of the Hausa mob was perhaps focused at what they measured as the allegedly crafty practices of Igbo traders in Kano, who they accused of cornering the “skilled and distributive trade.”

The attack proved serious around Fagge (a local government area in Kano) and the Sabon Gari (strangers’ quarters or literally new town) that machetes and locally-made guns were easily used by the Igbo to counter the bows and arrows of the Hausa-Fulani crowd. Potts, who had sought to bring in the police to confront the rioters, was advised against doing so for fear that the Hausa-Fulani, who always distrusted the police due to perceived Igbo majority in the force, may well misread police deployment as a full scale war between them and the Igbo. For that reason, the police were reduced to the use of tear gas as a replacement for bullets. Even efforts to make the Emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero (1881-1953), "one of those just and pious rulers whose integrity and impartiality are unquestionable" and who died seven months later on Wednesday, December 23, 1953 [exactly a month after Chief Bode Thomas died mysteriously], to personally appeal to the Hausa-Fulani rioters were rejected as unwise. 

The burnt child fears the fire. It was feared that the riotous crowd may well misunderstand the Emir's  appearance to mean the green light for his readiness to lead a jihad against non-Muslims and doubters of the Quran. In the end, the Emir, who usually avoided talks about compromising his Islamic opinions regardless of his progressive thoughts, had to manage a broadcast call to his people to surrender their arms and cooperate with the motley force of his Dogorai (Bodyguards), the colonial police and the army. But, fighting did not stop until a few deaths had been recorded. In fact, thirty-six people had to go the way of all flesh and the seriously wounded had to reach the two hundred mark before violence finally ceased. Oliver Littleton [Lord Chandos] later explained to the House of Commons in London how difficult the situation in Nigeria had become at the time, saying:

"The last thing that I want to do is to raise the temperature of the House in this matter, but surely the right hon. Gentleman [MP H. Morrison] is quite out of touch with what is happening in Nigeria at the moment. The position is extremely difficult as a whole, and I am anxious to prevent any further disturbance and loss of life taking place. This is why I have to reject these specious suggestions and act now, because this is the only way in which these things are likely to be resolved."

These were incontrovertible facts that left the House of Commons with no choice but to back him. Kaduna also witnessed slight rioting and it was feared that it possibly might blowout to Jos, but the police took safety measures to avert possible eruptions of violence there. The Kaduna rioting and the coincident stranding of the Action Group delegation of Chief Akintola in Kano were no doubt a double strain on the security put in place. At the same time, the leader of an NCNC delegation, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, also had headed for Kaduna to hold his party’s convention there. On becoming aware of the looming danger as a result, the Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria, His Excellency, Sir Bryan Sherwood-Smith (1899-1983) immediately telephoned Max Backhouse, the Resident at Minna. Backhouse was the one who made the layout of an avenue leading up to the Emir’s palace in Argungu town as the then district administration was responsible for town planning in the old colonial days. For a fact, it was not until the 1950s that professional town planners arrived in Northern Nigeria (See "Into Africa and Out: Northern Nigeria 1956-1962" by David R. Ball – Courtesy of OSPA, Review by Richard Barlow-Poole, Northern Nigeria 1947-1968). 

Sherwood-Smith then directed Backhouse to meet the train of Dr. Azikiwe with a personal message advising the future President of Nigeria (1963-1966) that it would be imprudent for him to advance further since the army had now taken over security in both Kaduna and Kano. The Sherwood-Smith fresh intel, relayed through Backhouse, instantly dispelled any doubts Azikiwe hitherto had about the situation. Not to sail close to the wind, Zik punctually returned to Lagos as he had no other choice than to comply with the useful information that emanated from Sherwood-Smith, author of “But always as friends”: Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921-1957, London: Allen & Unwin, 1969. 

What Sherwood-Smith did not say was that the situation had become so grave in the North as a result of Enahoro's self-government motion that apprehension about Nigeria’s continued survival as one indivisible nation was generally giving rise to uncertainty, hesitancy, and distrust among the people. (See James Coleman: Nigerian Background to Nationalism op. cit. pp. 399-400. Also see Bryan Sherwood Smith: But Always as Friends, pp. 265-278). The Northerners' prescience in the matter was startling because the AG/NCNC alliance, which began in April 1953 and collapsed in August 1953, was indeed transient as the Lagos "issue" [as it was called] caused it to fail irretrievably. Though lasting for only four months, the alliance preserved Nigeria's unity due that the NPC had arrived the 1953 Conference in London armed with a confederation agenda. 

The Lagos issue had entertained the dispute over whether Lagos be allowed to remain exclusively as part of the Western Region or be decoupled nonexclusively from it and made a Federal Territory. While the AG, on the one hand, voted the former, i.e. for Lagos to remain with the West, the NCNC and the NPC, which sponsored the motion, on the other hand, voted the latter, i.e. for Lagos to be classed a federal capital. The issue became a subject of controversy that was greatly colored by sentiments expressed by many people in a fit of pique, and with a nagging presage of danger. Consequently, at a meeting of Northern leaders in Kaduna, the following eight-point fixed demand was handed out in the name of the North (See Daily Times of Friday, May 22, 1953). 

1.   "This region shall have complete legislative and executive autonomy with respect to all matters except the following: defence, external affairs, customs and West African research institutions.

2.    That there shall be no Central legislative body and no Central                   executive or policy making body for the whole of Nigeria.

3.    There shall be a Central agency for all Regions which will be     responsible for the matters mentioned in paragraph one and        other matters delegated to it by a Region.

4.   The Central Agency shall be at a neutral place preferably Lagos.

5.    The composition and responsibility of the Central Agency              shall be defined by the order-in-council establishing the      constitutional arrangement. The agency shall be a non-political body.

6.     The services of the railway, air services, posts and telegraphs,         electricity and coal mining shall be organized on an inter-Regional basis and shall be administered by public    corporations. These corporations shall be independent bodies covered by the statute under which they are created. The Board of the coal corporation shall be composed of experts with a minority Representation of the Regional government.

7.      All revenue shall be levied and collected by the Region government except customs revenue at the port of discharge by the Central Agency and paid to its treasury. The administration of the customs shall be so organized as to assure that goods consigned to the Region are separately cleared and charged to duty.

8.       Each Region shall have a separate public service.”  

                

Evidently, the Northern leaders had, by these demands, preferred or chosen a loose customs union or Confederation, which the AG-NCNC alliance - steadily supported by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1951-1954), Oliver Lyttleton, 1st Viscount Chandos (1893-1972) - kicked against vehemently. Britain had to move very fast; the World War II (1939-1945) and the failure to keep both India and Pakistan in 1947 are believed to have combined in shooting up Britain's treasure of Africa. Until then, the last thing on the colonialists' mind was agreeing to early independence for sub-Saharan colonies, with Nigeria leading the pack. Therefore, Lord Chandos' quick reaction to the crisis, which the Action Group leaders were happy about, was to rudely summon Sir John Macpherson to London soon after. At least, this step taken by Lord Chandos instantly dispelled some of their fears about the process.

Lyttleton now dispatched, Henry Hopkinson (1902-1996), his friend and Minister of State for Colonial Affairs (1952-1955) and 1st Baron Colyton, who relished an enchanting time in Africa in the 1960s, to Nigeria in the following month of April to iron things out with the leaders of the Action Group. The Baron Colyton would be correctly described by The Right Honorable Enoch Powell (1912-1998), in “Occasion, Chance and Change: A Memoir 1902-46," (Michael Russell Publishing, 272 pages, 1993), as "standing at a pivotal point in political history, a point where the imperial past and post-imperial present met", and that he deserved "a moment of respectful reflection" [See Steven Vines' “Obituary: Lord Colyton” of Monday, January 8, 1996]. 

Hopkinson, who later tendered his resignation in December 1955 only to be offered the Governor-Generalship of Nigeria or the post of High Commissioner in Australia which he refused and instead proceeded to the Lords, held a meeting with the Action Group leaders on Sunday, April 26, 1953. He explained his mission to Nigeria, which had the blessings of the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill (1871-1965), to include attending the Defence Conference, and to unearth the root of the present crisis, which had already caused quite a kerfuffle, to save the country from descending into political chaos. Awolowo and his AG colleagues then proceeded to itemize the shortcomings that they found in the Macpherson Constitution, both ante and post June 1952. Unarguably, the Macpherson Constitution failed to provide for the running of a party system at the Center. Each of the Regions was required to produce three members each from its House of Assembly who will become portfolio-handling Ministers and one from its House of Chiefs without portfolio. The Eastern Region, that then had no House of Chiefs, fetched all its four Ministers from its House of Assembly with one of them  representing the Southern Cameroons without portfolio. 

The Governor presided over the deliberations of the Council of Minister, which was also filled with some officials. The Council of Ministers was composed of three clashing political integers given that the three major parties [NPC, NCNC, and AG], had won the elections in the three Regions. But, the Action Group always found it disturbing each time the NCNC jumped to the NPC's defence whenever it criticized the Northern party for whatever reason. In addition, the official members of the Council were distrusted by the AG to function objectively. The party strutted and fretted over these officials' penchant to maneuver the country's commonly hostile parties against one another. As of a narrative, it was not insensible at all to the fact that getting the uncooperative Council of Ministers to favorably consider any of the AG's policies would be an Augean task to do or carry out. But, it was willing to give it a shot through its careful plan not to use the same Council as a place for policy articulation, but an appropriate field to seek to make the Macpherson Constitution better - sort of improve it from within.

Pleasantly surprised, they were thankful of, and tickled at, the promised prospect of redrawing the Nigerian Constitution to allow for greater Regional autonomy as well as discard the Center's powers to mediate in matters which the Regions can competently handle. This much was contained in Lyttleton's statement (on behalf of Her Majesty's Government) in the House of Commons on Thursday, May 21, 1953 [See Hansard, Commons Sitting, Nigeria (Constitution) HC Deb May 21, 1953, vol. 515 cc2263-8 2263]: 

"With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and the permission of the House, I should like to make a statement on the Nigerian Constitution.

"Recent events have shown that it is not possible for the three Regions of Nigeria to work together effectively in a federation so closely knit as that provided by the present Constitution. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, while greatly regretting this, consider that the Constitution will have to be redrawn to provide for greater regional autonomy and for the removal of powers of intervention by the Centre in matters which can, without detriment to other Regions, be placed entirely within regional competence. It is, at the same time, necessary to ensure that the common economic and defence requirements of all Regions are secured."

Bello recorded in his book, "Chapter 13 The First Lagos Conference":

"THE debate in the House of Representatives had its repercussions elsewhere too. The British Government in Nigeria were very worried and Sir John Macpherson took prompt action to stir up the Colonial Office to do something about it. And they must have worked unusually fast, for on the 21st May, just after we had passed the first motion, and just before we had reached the Eight Points, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced in the House of Commons that the British Government 'had regretfully decided that the Nigerian constitution would have to be redrawn to provide for greater Regional autonomy and the removal of power of intervention by the Centre in matters which could, without detriment to the other Regions, be placed entirely within the Regional competence'. This was a complicated and pompous way of saying that we might get something of what we were asking for.

"We did not know of this statement at the time of the Eight Points debate, but I am certain that it would not have made any difference to us if it had been known. It would still have been necessary for us to have made our points very clearly."

Although a time consuming task, Her Majesty's Government offered to cooperate fully with all the leaders of the three Regions - East, North, and West. It acted in good faith by proposing to have all the representatives from the three Regions of Nigeria come to London for discussions with focus on redrawing the Constitution as strongly canvassed by the Action Group. The statement continued:

"...In the work of redrawing the Constitution, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would wish to cooperate as closely as possible with the leaders of the people in all three Regions. The first requirement is to decide how this work can best be carried out. To this end, Her Majesty's Government will invite representatives from each Region to visit London for discussions with the Secretary of State."

It then became the primary duty of all the Regions to assist the Governor to succeed in the interim period, much as it equally became Her Majesty's Government's crystal work to see to it that in every eventuality, government in Nigeria ran virtually in the interest of all Nigerians. 

A closed mouth catches no flies. One bright morning at the Conference, Ahmadu Bello, whom the Southern delegates had thought was barking up the wrong tree and had kept quiet like a mouse for some time to see which way the cat would jump, developed a sudden urge to speak. Wait! Did the Sardauna want to change horses in mid stream? As Caesar's wife was above suspicion, no one suspected Bello had a card up his sleeve.

A political acrobat with a superb sense of balance, the Sardauna, with one arm tied literally behind his back, did an unanticipated political summersault. He abandoned the representationalism of his earlier contributions and claimed that he had had a complete change in attitude and opinion about the subject matter. A drowning man clutches at straws, thought his opponents. You could hear a pin drop. Intriguing! Bello suffered a sea change? Everyone seemed confused, yet interested. From then on, the Sardauna began to play his cards close to his chest since he genuinely believed he already had Lyttleton over a barrel. Meanwhile, he had an eye to the main chance. To finally strut his turf, he struck a balance by avowing his support for Federalism. It proved the unvarnished truth. Bello’s performance, which swiftly fetched him shouts of praise, encouragement, and applause, as a result, impressed as it excited everyone present, including the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Chandos. The Sardauna brought the house down.

This action taken by Ahmadu Bello had a motive behind it. It was to practice on Lyttleton's credulity, and it did with huge success. Bello, definitely Lyttleton’s ewe lamb, knew for a fact that he could not win the debate. Hence, his decision to withdraw and support Federalism. However, it had first seemed foolish to his Northern colleagues, who couldn't see that there was method in his madness <Refers to Shakespeare's "Hamlet" Act 2, Scene II>, but who were still held together by Uthman dan Fodio's "the old loyalties, the old decencies, the old beliefs." There was a disturbing detail that these delegates "of this varied Region" kept seeing in their mind's eye since the self-government motion by Enahoro failed in Lagos the previous year. But, as planned by the Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello, a tower of strength to his people, one good turn deserved another, and almost by the same token. 

Devoid of subtlety, Lyttleton, a superstitious and very simpleminded man, moved briskly to reward Bello's 'kindly' compromise. Obviously and deeply moved by such kindness (and concerned with gratifying the North's desires), Lord Chandos, in turn, tipped the balance by deciding to kickstart Bello's Lagos project. It is said, "Gather ye rosebuds while ye may": The Sokoto prince sure knew how to paddle his own canoe, didn't he?

At the drop of a hat and to the chagrin of Chief Awolowo and his Action Group delegation, when the moment of truth finally came, Lord Chandos crowned Lagos, the envy of the country - a "Federal Territory". He made no bones about his decision, which quickly turned music to the Sardauna's ears. Since having his heart set on Lagos, as far back as when the Northern politicians demanded amongst their eight-point non-negotiable demand made in Kaduna earlier that "The Central Agency shall be at a neutral place preferably Lagos," Bello had played his cards right and kept his nose clean. Until then, Lagos was a Yoruba predominantly populated area where Africans and Europeans had interfused seamlessly since the 19th century. It was a city, which its railway terminals -cum- databases and telephone networks hooking it to London, had been put in place as far back as 1886. 

With a slice of the cake in the bag in this manner, Ahmadu Bello's joy was boundless; his cup runneth over <Refers to King James Version’s wording of Psalm 23:5, "My cup runneth over">. The Sokoto prince was said to be rolling in the aisles. Why? He had not only set great store by the City of Lagos, a rose by any other name, he had salivated for it more than anything. Finally, his great strides had come to a satisfying fruition. Not to fall between two stools, he took delight in winning the battle, but losing the war. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Enough is as good as a feast: his Northern colleagues took their hats off to him. Exchange is no robbery. Bello felt peaceful and contented: pleased as Punch. <Refers to the puppet show character who is usually portrayed smiling gleefully>. He would later ensure that a northerner, in the person of Alhaji Musa Yar'adua (1912- ), father of the 13th President of Nigeria, Umar Musa Yar'adua (1951-2010) and Shehu Musa Yar'adua (1943-1997), Chief of Staff to the Olusegun Obasanjo military regime (1976-1979), was appointed Minister of Lagos Affairs during the First Republic (1960-1966). Yar'Adua represented Katsina Central in Parliament earlier in 1959 and was chosen as Minister of Training and Nigerianisation before his transfer to the newly created Ministry of Lagos Affairs in 1963.

The Westerners drew in their horns. “Did Lord Chandos just rub salt in the wound for them?” Did he just stick the knife in their Region? They seemed to ask among themselves and to wonder: “Federalism for Lagos? Well, not quite!” The justifiably unhappy Action Group leader, who had no doubt had his fill of the Sardauna's insufferable arrogance, hated to be left with egg on his face. Knowing that the Northern knives had been out for him and his Region since Enahoro moved his self-government motion in the House of Representatives in 1953, Awolowo read Lord Chandos’ decision in his 1960 book, "Awo", as give-and-take or, better still, a good-natured exchange, which proved a welcome solution in a bad situation. He seemed to have told his colleagues from the West that: "This is what the British rightly term 'any port in a storm'.” 

Awolowo, who hitherto respected Lord Chandos, immediately fell out with him on the Lagos issue. Though Chandos' decision was faultless, Awo took exception to how the Colonial Secretary had led his delegation into a trap over the matter. He also did not find the argument used by him to pull in such a dramatic verdict justifiable. But, that’s the way the cookie crumbles. Now, there was no use crying over split milk. It was too late to shut the door after the horse had bolted either. Lyttleton's decision to rob Peter to pay Paul touched Awolowo on the raw, but the Ikenne chieftain let nothing disturb his remarkable equanimity or balance. <Refers to Saints Peter and Paul who share the same feast day, 29th June>. Rather, he chalked it up to experience and took everything in stride. The future Leader of Opposition to the Balewa Government bit the bullet and readied to rise and shine again. He turned the other cheek. <Refers to Matthew 5:39, 'Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the left one also'>. Littleton, who did not understand that Ahmadu Bello had set his cap at him, also took the tide when it came. He arrogantly disclosed his decision to the House of Commons like this - bold as brass (See Hansard, Nigeria (Constitutional Conference) HC Deb 10 February 1954 vol. 523 cc 1181-4 1181), stating:

"..., the decision to make Lagos a federal area stands. Any question relating to the Constitution can be raised in 1956... The White Paper is in the Vote Office now."

Indubitably a vexed question, one Mr. J. Johnson, an MP, who obviously remained unconvinced by Lyttleton's confident disclosure, had asked Lord Chandos at once, ibid:

"On the question of Lagos, would the Minister confirm that the Action Group are adamant about its status but that they deliberately left it open until 1956 so that it would not inhibit the success - and undoubtedly it has been a success - of this conference in 1954?"

Lyttleton’s brusque and impatient reply, which noted that his decision on Lagos had struck a supportive chord with the general public in Nigeria, was:

"I can add nothing to what I have said. Any matter concerning to the Constitution is open for discussion in 1956. The hon. Member should also remember that the decision about Lagos has an overwhelming majority of Nigerians in its favor."

According to Encyclopedia Britannica:

"The provisions of the 1954 constitution led to the creation of the Federal Territory of Lagos (the 27-square-mile [70-square-km] area of Lagos Island, including the city of Lagos) and to the transfer of the city’s hinterland to the administrative region of Western Nigeria."

This arrangement limited the spreading out of Lagos City onto the mainland. From 1954 onward, the status of the "territory" became a shut and close case until 1967 when the creation of Lagos state by the Yakubu Gowon-led Federal Military Government (1966-1975) returned to the city control of its hinterland. 

To paraphrase Shaw, the British government that so robbed the Western Region to promote the Northern Region in this way, must now expect more support from the Northerners, and it, henceforth, reaped bountifully in this direction. Chief Awolowo would later claim that he was not at all involved emotionally in the matter at the time based on the fact that the people of Lagos and their kindred in the West were related through common descent. He acknowledged ibid, of course, with the advantage of hindsight, that in spite of everything, separating Lagos from the Western Region in 1954 was certainly most appropriate because it turned out to be "good" for the Region. That, in fact, it was a blessing in disguise since Lagos, unknown to many people then, was "a financial liability to the Western Region." For example, the country's first Leader of Government Business and Minister of Local Government, who took charge of the government of Western Nigeria on Wednesday, February 6, 1952 on the strength of the outcome of the Monday, September 24, 1951 general election as well as following the House's first meeting at Agodi Gardens, Ibadan, on Monday, January 7, 1952, and is credited with being "responsible for much of the progressive social legislation that has made Nigeria a modern nation", further claimed that Lagos alone gulped 45% of the total expenditure on medical services for the entire Region, etc., etc... (See “Awo”, his autobiography, pages 248 & 249). Could Awolowo also be whistling in the dark? But then, we never know the worth of the water till the well runs dry, do we? It was the tip of the iceberg!